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Given uncertainty in policy, particularly around Brexit, how do private equity (PE) firms
investing in the UK behave? Analysing their response is vital for understanding the im-
pact on investment per se and designing policy that limits uncertainty. Building on the
recent work of Mike Wright and co-authors, we explore the effect of uncertainty mea-
sures on UK PE activity and the channels that transmit uncertainty to the PE market.
After developing hypotheses that link the ‘PE activity and uncertainty’ relation via a real
options, interim risk or moral hazard channel, we employ a novel dataset on PE targets
and non-targets over the 2010–2019 period.We find that uncertainty, especially newmea-
sures closely aligned to Brexit, have negatively affected PE activity in the UK.Moreover,
the transmission of such uncertainty occurs primarily through the real options channel
and through greater uncertainty arising from prolonged interim periods of PE deals (i.e.
the interim risk channel). Our results imply that the present and ongoing uncertainty in
Brexit policy will continue to depress PE activity and by extension, investment and growth
in the UK. Policymakers are urged to resolve such uncertainties.
Introduction
… for management researchers, Brexit provides a
natural experiment to explore the effects on PE of
a major exogenous shock. (Wright et al., 2016: 682)
The Brexit vote to leave the European Union
(EU), recorded at the UK referendum of 23 June
2016, was a momentous event. Largely unexpected
by most academics, practitioners and policymak-
ers, the result led to a considerable rise in uncer-
tainty for UK business in general.1 Such Brexit-
related uncertainty is different to prior uncertainty
shocks due partially to its length, magnitude and
1The referendum outcome was a largely unexpected event
as the leaders of the three largest parties in theUKand the
majority of MPs were pro-remain. We thank an anony-
mous reviewer for this point.
political complexity (Bloom et al., 2018, 2019) and
the ongoing and widespread impact is still being
debated and evaluated. So far, the focus has typi-
cally been on the detrimental economic effects of
Brexit (e.g. Bloom et al., 2019; Born et al., 2019;
Hassan et al., 2020; Hill, Korczak and Korczak,
2019; McGrattan and Waddle, 2020; Steinberg,
2019; VanReenen, 2016) and the related impact on
banks and financial markets (e.g. Berg et al., 2019;
Davies and Studnicka, 2018; Hudson, Urquhart
and Zhang, 2020; Schiereck, Kiesel and Kolaric,
2016).
Recent work by Wright et al. (2016) explores
the impact of uncertainty from the Brexit referen-
dum on the UK private equity (PE) market, not-
ing that the UK PE market is the largest in Eu-
rope. In particular, they highlight that whilst in
the years that followed the global financial crisis
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(GFC) of 2007/8, the PE market recovered to pre-
crisis activity levels, deal values fell precipitously
in 2016, reflecting higher uncertainty. Moreover,
the paper posits early in the Brexit debate that
the referendum result produced an extraordinary
shock, damaging market confidence and likely im-
pairing PE funds’ returns as well as their ability
to fundraise and relatedly, their reliance on debt
availability. In contrast, the future activities of UK
PE firms may be subject to less regulation, pos-
sibly generating a deregulation premium, and the
EUwill no longer necessarily be able to inhibit UK
state aid. Hence, Wright et al. (2016) conclude by
stressing that Brexit generates both threats and op-
portunities for PE activity in the UK and creates
‘an exciting new research agenda’ (p. 685) for re-
searchers in entrepreneurial finance.2
Building on the work of Wright and co-authors,
and other existing literature on PE (e.g. Cumming,
Peter and Tarsalewska, 2020; Hotchkiss, Ström-
berg and Smith, 2014; Kaplan and Strömberg,
2009; Lerner, Sorensen and Strömberg, 2011;
Leslie and Oyer, 2009; for an excellent review see
Gilligan and Wright, 2020), our paper investigates
two associated research questions. Firstly, what is
the effect of uncertainty and, in particular, Brexit-
related uncertainty, on PE activity in the UK? Sec-
ondly, what are the channels that operationalize
the transmission of uncertainty to the PE market?
In terms of measuring activity, we follow others
(e.g. Wright et al., 2016)3 in defining PE as the
‘risk capital employed to finance the acquisition of
mature businesses via a leveraged buyout (LBO)’.
Less straightforward is the identification of an ap-
propriate analytical framework, given that the con-
ceptualization and measurement of uncertainty is
a non-trivial task. To circumvent this, we employ a
set of uncertainty measures, including the Bloom
et al. (2019) Brexit Uncertainty Index (BUI) and
the Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016) Economic Pol-
icy Uncertainty (EPU) index.
Our analysis is performed on a novel dataset that
we construct by conflating several data sources.We
collect data on buyout investors and targets from
2Policymakers, analysts and PE practitioners have ex-
pressed concerns about the implications of Brexit. See,
for example, Bank of England (2019); British Private
Equality and Venture Capital Association (2019); De-
loitte (2016).
3The same paper notes that LBOs represent about three-
quarters of total UK merger and acquisition activity.
S&PMarket Intelligence and Capital IQ, identify-
ing UK targets acquired by PE buyout firms over
the 2010–2019 period and following standard deal
classification criteria from the existing literature
(see Axelson et al., 2013; Faccio and Hsu, 2017).
Subsequently, we employ Capital IQ, Compustat
Global and Orbis databases to obtain data for the
necessary accounting and financial fundamentals
of our sample targets. After matching targets to
available accounting data, we obtain a sample of
765 UK targets. Moreover, to provide a suitable
control group to these targets, we consider all UK
firms with analogous size characteristics, generat-
ing a final dataset of 290,022 firms.
To derive appropriate hypotheses, we follow
Bonaime, Gulen and Ion (2018) and Adra,
Barbopoulos and Saunders (2020) in drawing on
related literature, including: work positing that un-
certainty will increase the real options to delay in-
vestment (cf. Gulen and Ion, 2016; Quigg, 1993);
notions of an interim risk channel of uncertainty
(see Bhagwat, Dam and Harford, 2016), where pe-
riods of high uncertainty widen the interim period
occurring between announcement and completion
of an acquisition (or buyout deal); and principal–
agent theory, whereby greater uncertainty can lead
to increased moral hazard if limited partners’
(principals’) ability to control general partners
(agents) is impaired. In doing so, our investigation
sheds light on the impact of uncertainty for PE
and entrepreneurial finance (e.g. Brown, Linares-
Zegarra and Wilson, 2019; Cumming and Zahra,
2016; Wright et al., 2016), the general economic
and financial effects of uncertainty (e.g. Baker,
Bloom and Davis, 2016; Bonaime, Gulen and Ion,
2018; Drobetz et al., 2018; Gulen and Ion, 2016)
and related issues of effective policy for supporting
investment during periods of higher uncertainty
due to exogenous shocks.
We find that Brexit uncertainty negatively af-
fects UK PE activity, primarily arises from pol-
icy, foreign exchange (FX) and chief financial offi-
cer (CFO) (firm-level) uncertainty, and transmits
through real options and interim risk channels.
These results imply that the industries most deeply
affected are those relying on fixed assets, durable
goods or heavily exposed to the EU, because of
their export/import activities. We also find that
the impact and transmission of uncertainty varies
according to the different nature of uncertainty
itself. Different types of uncertainty have differ-
ent degrees of persistence or lead to longer deal
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interim periods, therefore ‘scaring off’ potential
PE investors. These considerations lead us to urge
policymakers to address uncertainty arising from
Brexit whilst encouraging a more holistic view of
uncertainty ‘types’ and channels.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.
The next section considers the extant literature and
theoretical underpinnings of our work, whilst the
third section provides an overview of the data. The
fourth section presents the empirical methodology
and results on the effects of uncertainty onPEbuy-
out activity, whilst the fifth section explores the
channels of transmission. The final, sixth section
concludes.
Literature and theoretical underpinnings
Uncertainty
As noted in the Introduction, the conceptualiza-
tion and measurement of uncertainty, and in par-
ticular policy-related economic uncertainty, is not
straightforward. Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016:
1598) comment, ‘We aim to capture uncertainty
about who will make economic policy decisions,
what economic policy actions will be undertaken
and when, and the economic effects of policy
actions (or inaction) – including uncertainties re-
lated to the economic ramifications of “noneco-
nomic” policy matters, for example, military ac-
tions’.Most likely, types of uncertainty (e.g. policy,
Brexit, pandemic, monetary and fiscal) will affect
individual sectors of the economy differently and
display varying degrees of persistence. For this rea-
son, when analysing such uncertainty, it is crucially
important to model the economic effect of vari-
ous uncertainty measures and their related trans-
mission mechanisms.
In this paper, we address this issue by collecting a
set of measures, reflecting differing (but potentially
overlapping) aspects of uncertainty. Firstly, the
Baker, Bloom andDavis (2016) EPU index quanti-
fiesUKpolicy-related economic uncertainty by ex-
amining the frequency of the words ‘uncertain’ or
‘uncertainty’, ‘economic’ or ‘economy’, as well as
other policy-relevant terms, such as ‘policy’, ‘tax’,
‘spending’, ‘regulation’, ‘Bank of England’, ‘bud-
get’ and ‘deficit’ in the 11 most popular UK news-
papers. Secondly, we include an index created by
the Bank of England on UK macroeconomic un-
certainty which reflects the economic uncertainty
of British households and companies.More specif-
ically, this combines macroeconomic measures of
economic and financial market uncertainty with
survey data collected by the Bank of England on
households’ and firms’ short and medium-term
expectations.
Our third and fourth measures capture financial
market uncertainty: specifically, sterling option-
implied volatility (i.e. exchange rate uncertainty)
and the FTSE All-Share option-implied volatility
(i.e. stock market uncertainty). Both measures are
likely to, at least partially, reflect Brexit-related ex-
pectations of investors. Our fifth and final measure
attempts to explicitly identify uncertainty arising
from the Brexit referendum. In contrast to indices
described beforehand, the Bloom et al. (2019) BUI
is built using surveys to the CFOs of approxi-
mately 3,000 UK businesses, therefore capturing
company-level uncertainty.
Uncertainty and the level, value and likelihood of
LBOs
Wright et al. (2016) remark that in the first half of
2016, UK PE deal values decreased significantly
and suggest that this reflected higher macroeco-
nomic uncertainties, in part due to the uncertain-
ties surrounding Brexit. They argue that in this
environment, PE firms find it difficult to both
raise investment and obtain debt (e.g. via banks
or debt funds). This funding squeeze, when com-
bined with potentially fewer buyout opportunities,
can lead to a reduction in the overall number as
well as the value of deals. In any case, Ljungqvist,
Richardson and Wolfenzon (2020) and Malenko
andMalenko (2015) find that buyouts significantly
accelerate when credit market conditions ease. Ex-
tending this work, Axelson et al. (2013) examine
capital structure theories using cross-sectional fac-
tors and showing that credit conditions are the
main driver of PE acquisitions.
In a more general context of US mergers and
acquisitions (M&As), Bonaime, Gulen and Ion
(2018) show empirically that policy-related eco-
nomic uncertainty is negatively associated with
M&Aactivity. Several theoretical rationales for the
linkage are investigated, including the real options
channel (see Bloom, 2009), the interim risk chan-
nel (Bhagwat, Dam and Harford, 2016) and moral
hazard framing (Duchin and Schmidt, 2013).
We shall explore these potential transmission
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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channels for uncertainty in more detail below but
when combined with earlier arguments that relate
uncertainty to worsening credit conditions, they
lead to our first hypothesis.
H1: Greater uncertainty significantly reduces the
level, value and likelihood of PE buyouts.
Of course, it could be that greater uncertainty
causes PE firms to simply delay investment, rather
than engage in an actual reduction. However,
there is some prima facie evidence that the effects
of policy-related economic uncertainty (including
Brexit) can be long-lasting. For example, Bloom
et al. (2019: 2) suggests, ‘Brexit is unusual in that it
generated persistent uncertainty – three years after
the original vote, the UKhad not left the EU, there
was still no clarity on the eventual outcome […]’.
Such persistence in uncertainty can lead to persis-
tent effects on variables of interest, and this leads
to our second hypothesis.
H2: Greater policy uncertainty, including Brexit,
presents persistent and negative effects on PE
firms’ buyout likelihood.
The real options PE transmission channel
In the next three subsections, we examine the trans-
mission channels of uncertainty to the UK PE
market. To begin, we note that when uncertainty
is higher, the value of the real options to de-
lay investment increases (cf. Gulen and Ion, 2016;
Quigg, 1993). In a buyout context, this implies that
when uncertainty is elevated, PE firms could have
a greater incentive to postpone buyouts. As a re-
sult of this argument, PE firms performing buy-
outs during periods of elevated uncertainty are ei-
ther those for which delaying investment is more
costly or those that cannot delay the investment.
This has important implications in terms of the
bargaining power between buyer (PE firm) and
seller (portfolio firm management/shareholders),
since it potentially increases the bargaining power
of the seller.Within this theoretical framework, the
value of the option depends on three main fac-
tors. Firstly, the degree of investment irreversibil-
ity – clearly, the less reversible the investment, the
higher the value of an option to delay. Secondly,
the cost of postponing the buyout. For example,
and as is suggested by Grenadier (2002), delaying
investment is considerably more expensive when
the target firms operate in a highly competitive in-
dustry, where a delay could lead to competitors’
appropriation of part of the benefits (profitabil-
ity) yielded by the investment project. Finally, the
extent to which uncertainty affects the investment
target (i.e. the PE portfolio target). Bloom et al.
(2019: 2) emphasizes, ‘The vote for Brexit was a
largely unexpected event and we observe that it
has had a heterogeneous impact on firms accord-
ing to their pre-referendum exposure to Europe’.
In this spirit, we argue that the incentive to delay
investment when uncertainty arises is likely greater
for industries that are more exposed to Brexit (e.g.
those relying more on the external trade sector).
Taken together, these arguments lead to our third
hypothesis.
H3: Greater uncertainty increases the real options
value for PE firms to delay investment.
Interim risk channel of uncertainty
Next, we explore the interim risk channel of uncer-
tainty, proposed by Bhagwat, Dam and Harford
(2016). They posit that in periods of higher un-
certainty, interim periods between the announce-
ment and completion of an acquisition tend to
be wider. Longer interim periods significantly dis-
courage M&As – and of course LBOs and man-
agement buyout (MBOs) – since equity prices are
highly volatile in the interim period. Indeed, tar-
get price volatility strongly enhances the risk for
the acquirer in a public-to-private transaction (i.e.
leading to less convenient buyout terms) andmore-
over, can increase the cost of bank financing and
the risk of breaking debt covenants.
Considering the persistence of policy-related
economic uncertainty and the related Brexit refer-
endum,we suggest that PE investors could have de-
cided to delay (or dismiss) buyout investment in the
UK because of the greater interim risk imposed
by the inherent complexities in the relationship be-
tween EU andUK (e.g. market access, labour mar-
ket rules, regulatory changes and so on), leading to
our fourth hypothesis.
H4: Greater uncertainty is transmitted to the PE
buyout market via the interim risk channel.
At this point, it can be noted that several trans-
mission channels can co-exist; therefore, any evi-
dence of an interim risk channel would not con-
tradict evidence for the real options channel.
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Moral hazard channel
Lastly, we consider the existence of amoral hazard
channel of uncertainty, as suggested by Duchin
and Schmidt (2013). According to this theoreti-
cal framing, greater uncertainty can lead to greater
moral hazard incentives if limited partners’ (prin-
cipals’) ability to control general partners (agents)
is impaired, creating ‘empire-building incentives’.
Lower control can motivate general partners to in-
vest in deals of lower quality and try to ‘rip off’
target companies’ profit and cash holdings. The
question of whether PE buyouts are optimal for
portfolio target firms has been the subject of ex-
tensive academic and policymaker debate,4 with
considerable evidence of greater ‘value-destroying’
deals when moral hazard incentives are at play. Of
course, it is perhaps likely that the moral hazard
channel is not the primary transmission channel
of (Brexit) uncertainty; however, some effects from
this channel may still play a role in buyout deci-
sions. This leads to our fifth hypothesis.
H5: Greater uncertainty is transmitted to the PE
buyout market via the moral hazard channel.
Data
Data on buyouts
To identify UK PE targets from 2010 to 2019, we
first use data from S&P Market Intelligence and
Capital IQ and the methodology outlined in Axel-
son et al. (2013) and Faccio and Hsu (2017). This
approach recognizes PE buyouts based on the deal
structure adopted in the acquisition of the portfo-
lio firm, the target’s country of incorporation and
the investment stages adopted by the PE investor5
(see Appendix A in the online supporting informa-
tion for more details on dataset construction).
Second, we use Capital IQ, Compustat Global
and Orbis to obtain several accounting measures
that are potential drivers of PE buyouts in theUK.
These include total assets, return on assets (ROA),
leverage and cash-to-assets (see Section B.1.2 in
4Poul Rasmussen (former Danish PrimeMinister and au-
thor of the European Commission’s Alternative Invest-
ment Fund Managers Directive) stated that, ‘“leveraged
buy-outs” leave the company saddled with debt and in-
terest payments, its workers are laid off, and its assets are
sold … benefiting neither workers nor the real economy’
(Rasmussen, 2008: 130–132).
5There is no country restriction for PE firms.
the online supporting information). This informa-
tion is available for 765 target firms – constituting
our sample of UK target portfolio firms – and al-
lows for a rich set of firm-specific control variables.
This study covers three main categories of buy-
outs: LBOs, going private transactions andMBOs.
These constitute 25% of all PE activity in the UK,
a significant portion, over the period of analysis
(2010–2019)6 and consisting of a total buyout vol-
ume of US$180 trillion.
Among buyouts, LBOs constitute the large ma-
jority of PE transactions in the UK and reach a
maximum of 92% in 2013 (see Table 1, Panel A).
As is evident from Figure 1, after the Brexit ref-
erendum in 2016 we observe a slowdown in UK
buyout activity, with a substantial decrease in in-
vestment amounts; this coincides with a reduction
in the absolute numbers of these types of deals (see
Table 1, Panel B). Going private transactions reach
their peak in 2019, when the percentage of funds
invested almost equals that of LBOs (see Table 1,
Panel A). In Figure 1 we also juxtapose buyouts
in the UK and the rest of the world (RoW). No-
ticeable differences between the two series appear
to correspond with phases of elevated uncertainty,
over both the whole sample period and those peri-
ods associated with Brexit.
To form an appropriate control group for UK
PE targets, we obtained the universe of all UK
(listed and unlisted) firms from Orbis and infor-
mation on their financial statements, industry sec-
tor, age and so on. In a further refinement, we only
consider UK firms with similar size characteristics
to our PE targets (see Appendix C in the online
supporting information). We merged this refined
dataset with our data on UK PE targets, gener-
ating a final annual frequency sample of 290,022
firms from 2010 to 2019
Measures of uncertainty
As discussed earlier, different types of uncertainty
will have differing effects on separate sectors of the
economy and are likely to display varying degrees
of persistence. Therefore, we collect a set of uncer-
6Other deal structures include: acquisition financings,
add-on, asset acquisitions, other corporate acquisi-
tions/divestitures, follow-on offerings, growth capital
transactions, initial public offerings, mergers, private in-
vestment in public equity, private placement transactions,
recapitalizations and other unclassified activities.
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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(a) Natural logarithm of total buyout volume 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1. Buyout activity in the UK vs. the rest of the world (RoW): (a) natual logarithm of total buyout volume; (b) yearly moving
average [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Notes: The figure uses all deals with structure of leveraged buyout, management buyout and going private transactions. These are presented
in (a) as the natural logarithm of the total number of buyout deals and of the total buyout volume in USD mn in the UK vs. in the RoW.
In (b), we present instead the 12-month moving average of the total number of buyout deals and of the total buyout volume in USD mn
in the UK vs. in the RoW. Both (a) and (b) indicate a strong deviation of the two series after the Brexit referendum. This is particularly
elevated after the triggering of Article 50.
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Table 1. Investment in PE buyouts
Date Going private LBO MBO Total
Panel A: Percentage invested in each PE buyouts structure
2010 10% 74% 16% 100%
2011 6% 70% 24% 100%
2012 12% 78% 10% 100%
2013 0% 92% 8% 100%
2014 8% 80% 12% 100%
2015 0% 89% 11% 100%
2016 14% 81% 5% 100%
2017 22% 72% 6% 100%
2018 31% 66% 3% 100%
2019 43% 56% 1% 100%
Panel B: Total number of PE buyout deals in the UK
2010 9 160 70 239
2011 12 188 86 286
2012 10 173 79 262
2013 1 178 67 246
2014 7 234 99 340
2015 1 193 70 264
2016 4 184 59 247
2017 6 178 65 249
2018 4 196 57 257
2019 7 166 48 221
Notes: In this table we present British PE buyouts disaggregated in their individual deal structure: going private, LBO, MBO. In Panel
A, we report the portion PE investment allocated to each of the three deal structures reported above in a given year. In Panel B, we
report instead the total number of buyout deals in the UK in a considered year. Once again, we disclose both the aggregate number
of deals in a given year and the individual amount of deals as divided: going private, LBO, MBO. The numbers of deals in Panel B
include multiple purchases of the same target in a given year. In this case, each deal is considered as separate, even if it involves the
same target.
tainty measures, which we explore in more detail
below.
Policy-related economic uncertainty. Our first
measure is the EPU index of Baker, Bloom and
Davis (2016). The index measures domestic uncer-
tainty derived from British newspapers by exam-
ining the frequency of words identifying several
dimensions of uncertainty related to government.
To extract themonthly value of policy uncertainty,
the index is then normalized to obtain a standard
deviation of 1 and a mean 100 before 2011.
The index cleverly captures a dimension of un-
certainty (sentiment) concerning government poli-
cies that were previously difficult to quantify. As
reported in Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016), at a
macro level, the EPU index displays a high corre-
lation with popular uncertainty measures (e.g. im-
plied stock market volatility) and a lack of bias to-
wards newspapers’political orientation.Moreover,
the EPU index seems to have some success in pre-
dicting variations in employment and investment.
As a result, this measure of uncertainty is widely
used in the extant economic and finance literature.
As shown in Figure 2, the EPU index increased
at the start of the GFC andmost strikingly, we can
observe a sharp increase during 2016, at the time
of the Brexit referendum. The ‘Brexit period’ itself
seems to be characterized by more volatility in the
EPU index.
Index of macroeconomic uncertainty. Our second
measure of uncertainty is an index of macroeco-
nomic uncertainty produced by the Bank of Eng-
land (cf. Haddow et al., 2013). The index considers
a wide range of dimensions of uncertainty, which
are aggregated by the bank using principal compo-
nent analysis and subsequently, retrieving the first
principal component. In more detail, the index in-
cludes the 3-month option-implied volatility of the
FTSE All-Share index, and the 3-month option-
implied volatility of sterling–euro and sterling–
dollar export-weighted exchange rates, as generic
proxies of overall corporate sector uncertainty.
It also incorporates the dispersion of annual
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Brexit Period UK_EPU_Index BUI
Figure 2. Brexit uncertainty and UK economic policy uncertainty
Notes: Monthly data are used for this figure. EPU and BUI represent the indices of economic policy uncertainty and Brexit uncertainty,
respectively. The shaded area corresponds to the period onwards from the Brexit referendum.
company earnings GDP growth forecasts, which
provide a supply-sidemeasure of private sector un-
certainty. Lastly, as a proxy for demand-side un-
certainty, the measure uses several surveys assess-
ing businesses’ expectations and sentiment, such
as: (i) the GfK unemployment expectations bal-
ance; (ii) the CBI ‘demand uncertainty limiting in-
vestment’ score; and (iii) the number of press arti-
cles citing ‘economic uncertainty’. The former two
surveys are used by the bank to assess the impact
of greater unemployment and households’ precau-
tionary savings on domestic demand; the latter is
meant as a barometer of the ‘public mood’.
FTSE All-Share index and sterling option-implied
volatility. We separately include the FTSE All-
Share index and sterling option-implied volatility
(described above) in our regression models as in-
dicators of financial (stock and FX) market un-
certainty. Equity option-implied volatility is one
of the most popular measures of financial market
uncertainty. The underlying idea is that the higher
the uncertainty about the future performance of
the UK stock market, the higher the price that in-
vestors – including PE investors highly exposed to
their target performance – would be prepared to
pay for options hedging their risk. This measure,
therefore, provides a forward-looking measure of
investors’ expectations after an uncertainty shock.
In the wake of the Brexit referendum, UK in-
vestors and businesses observed drastic variations
in the value of sterling. In October 2016, during
the so-called ‘sterling flash crash’, the dollar rate
fell below $1.20 (as low as 1.15$), reaching the low-
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Figure 3. Other measures of uncertainty in the UK
Note: Annual data are used for this figure.
est value since 1985, and experienced an unprece-
dented level of volatility. Sharp variations in the
exchange rate significantly affect UK businesses,
by impacting their export prices – reducing their
export-related revenues – and increasing the cost
of imported production input. For PE firms, a
significant decrease in operating financial perfor-
mance reduces the incentive to invest in UK busi-
nesses. In Figure 3, we show the time-series pattern
of uncertainty across all the previously described
measures.
Brexit Uncertainty Index. In an attempt to iso-
late the effect of Brexit-specific uncertainty onUK
firms, we employ the Bloom et al. (2019) BUI. This
index is built using survey data from the Decision
Maker Panel (DMP), a monthly survey performed
on awide sample of UKfirms across several indus-
tries. Through the survey, the authors estimate the
extent to which Brexit has been affecting British
firms, which industries have been more impacted
and how.7 The BUI crucially extends the scope of
the DMP by estimating the portion of firms heav-
ily affected by Brexit uncertainty – measured as
the percentage of CFOs reporting Brexit in the top
three sources of uncertainty in the DMP survey.
7This is accomplished by asking detailed questions to
CFOs on their exposure to Brexit (e.g. by asking about
their share of sales to the EU, their share of EU exports
or the share of EU migrants in their workforce) and their
expected percentage change in performance in compari-
son to the previous fiscal year (Bloom et al., 2019, 2020).
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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BUI, therefore, provides a relatively clear-cut iden-
tification of the transmission of Brexit uncertainty
to the UK corporate sector.
In Figure 2, we present a graphical representa-
tion of the BUI, alongside the EPU index. Com-
pared to the EPU index and other indexes of un-
certainty, uncertainty captured by the BUI remains
elevated and even increases following the referen-
dum. Notably, the highest values of Brexit uncer-
tainty appear in 2018–2019 (i.e. close to the orig-
inal deadline for Brexit negotiations), when more
than 50% of all CFOs surveyed in the DMP re-
port Brexit as one of the top three sources of un-
certainty for their firm.
Other macroeconomic and industry specific control
variables
In line with Valkama et al. (2013), we also include
several macroeconomic and industry control vari-
ables. According to the authors, these are in fact
important drivers of buyout returns in the UK –
in particular target industry growth fundamentals,
which explains most of the heterogeneity in PE
investors’ performance.8 Our first macroeconomic
control is a proxy for the UK economic activ-
ity (henceforth ‘Investment Opportunity Index’).
This is computed using several proxies of the fu-
ture performance of the economy, such as: (i) the
agents’ survey of investment intentions, Confeder-
ation of British Industry (CBI) survey on invest-
ment intentions, Bank of England’s general eco-
nomic situation expectations survey; (ii) Bank of
England’s household personal financial situation
expectations survey and unemployment projection
(inverted); and (iii) Bank of England one year-
ahead GDP growth forecast at market rates. To
avoidmulticollinearity issues, without losing infor-
mation, we compute the first principal component
of the series reported above. We also control for
market liquidity using the UK TED spread, em-
ploying data collected from the Bank of England.
As industry-specific controls, we use the indus-
try median of proxies for equity valuation (i.e.
36-month cumulative stock return) and volatil-
ity (i.e. standard deviation of the former vari-
able), as indicators of industry performance. We
include industry median Tobin’s q as an additional
8Valkama et al. (2013) find that in the UK economic per-
formance, industry growth and stock market returns are
the main predictors of PE buyout returns.
forward-looking proxy of firms’ valuation, where
a high Tobin’s q indicates high valuation peri-
ods. Lastly, to create proxies for industry-level eco-
nomic shocks, we combine CRSP and Compus-
tat Global databases and follow Harford (2005) to
construct each of the 48 Fama and French (1997)
industries (see Appendix B in the online support-
ing information).
Empirical methodology and results
The response of PE buyouts to different measures
of uncertainty
In this section we examine investment dynamics at
the firm level. Specifically, using a logit model, we
estimate the probability of a buyout – investing in
an LBO, MBO and/or going private transaction –
as a function of the mean level of uncertainty in
the previous year, after controlling for numerous
determinants of PE investment. In our logit re-
gression model therefore, Yj = 1 if a given firm
j receives a buyout in year t + 1; Yj = 0 if firm j
does not receive a buyout. Subsequently, we esti-
mate the probability of Yj = 1 given a set of firm-
level, industry-level and macro-level independent
variables in the following manner:
P(Y = 1| x1, x2, . . . , xn) = f (x1, x2, . . . , xn) .
(1)
Uncertainty and the likelihood of a buyout. The
results of our baseline logit estimations, presented
in Table 2, support H1 since for several uncertainty
measures, greater uncertainty significantly reduces
the likelihood of PE buyouts the following year.
In particular, the EPU index, sterling option-
implied volatility and BUI (see Table 2, columns
1, 3 and 5, respectively) are negatively signed and
statistically significant, the first and latter measure
at the 1% level. In other words, increases in these
three measures significantly reduce the likelihood
of UK PE buyouts in the upcoming year. Turn-
ing to the marginal effects of the considered logit
models (at themean), consider the case of BUI, the
most explicit measure of Brexit uncertainty.9 Here,
a 1% increase in BUI leads to a mean marginal de-
crease in the likelihood of buyouts in the following
year of about 0.016%, corresponding to approxi-
9See Table A.6 in the online supporting information for
the marginal effects.
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Table 2. Uncertainty and PE buyout activity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Buyout t+1 Buyout t+1 Buyout t+1 Buyout t+1 Buyout t+1




Sterling option-implied volatility −0.165 **
(0.071)
FTSE option-implied volatility 0.062
(0.172)
Brexit uncertainty (BUI) −0.108 ***
(0.026)
Investment opportunity −0.096 * −0.073 −0.014
(0.057) (0.057) (0.034)
Industry shock 0.354 *** 0.356 *** 0.368 *** 0.354 *** 0.377 ***
(0.078) (0.078) (0.080) (0.078) (0.077)
TED spread −1.451 −0.501 −1.011 −0.616
(0.911) (0.885) (0.931) (0.939)
Industry cumulative returns −0.771 *** −0.696 *** −0.808 *** −0.641 ** −0.531 **
(0.222) (0.249) (0.237) (0.251) (0.234)
Industry cumulative STD returns 0.237 0.418 0.501 0.325 −0.399
(0.598) (0.602) (0.588) (0.613) (0.640)
Industry q 0.443 *** 0.440 *** 0.412 *** 0.451 *** 0.499 ***
(0.094) (0.094) (0.098) (0.095) (0.090)
Total assets 0.004 *** 0.005 *** 0.004 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ROA 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Leverage −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 *
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash-to-asset −1.593 *** −1.593 *** −1.593 *** −1.592 *** −1.590 ***
(0.254) (0.255) (0.255) (0.255) (0.253)
Constant −6.640 *** −7.295 *** −7.159 *** −7.385 *** −7.243 ***
(0.328) (0.254) (0.265) (0.321) (0.196)
Observations 412,622 412,622 412,622 412,622 412,622
Notes: The table displays the results of our baseline logistic regression of the likelihood of a buyout (buyout t+1) on economic policy
uncertainty (column 1), macro-economic uncertainty (column 2), sterling option-implied volatility index (column 3), FTSE All-Share
option-implied volatility index (column 4) and Brexit uncertainty (column 5). All regressions are supplemented with several controls
for industry and target-specific economic fundamentals. In each regression, the dependent variable assumes a value of 1 if at time t+1 a
certain target firm is the object of a buyout, and 0 otherwise. All independent variables are continuous and measured instead at time t.
Further in-depth information on the variables included in this table is reported in the Section B.1 of the online supporting information.
***, **, * mark regression coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
mately 79% of the unconditional probability of a
buyout during the Brexit period.
By contrast, in Table 2, both the Bank of Eng-
land macroeconomic uncertainty index and the
FTSE All-Share option-implied volatility are not
significant at the 10% level (see columns 2 and
4). We gently attribute this finding to the differ-
ent components and forecast horizons of the un-
certainty measures; for example, the FTSE All-
Share option-implied volatility might be consid-
ered a short-term indicator. In any case, such a re-
sult sheds light on the importance of considering
differences in indicators of uncertainty when as-
sessing impact on domestic economic activity and
investment.
Other control variables included in the re-
gressions are portfolio targets’ specific controls,
such as the natural logarithm of the firm assets,
ROA, firms’ leverage (computed as liabilities-over-
equity), and cash and equivalents-over-assets. As
standard, some control variables are omitted from
the regression if they display high correlation with
the core explanatory variable of the regression, to
avoid multicollinearity problems (see Appendix D
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Table 3. The persistence of uncertainty effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Buyout t+1 Buyout t+2 Buyout t+3 Buyout t+4 Buyout t+5
Panel A: Economic policy uncertainty
Policy uncertainty (EPU) −0.280 *** −0.225 *** −0.095 0.793 * 0.462
(0.089) (0.086) (0.077) (0.415) (0.602)
Observations 412,622 362,609 311,788 261,615 214,549
Macroeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Sterling option-implied volatility
Sterling option-implied volatility −0.165 ** −0.181 *** −0.007 0.220 ** 0.132
(0.071) (0.069) (0.065) (0.089) (0.122)
Observations 412,622 362,609 311,788 261,615 214,549
Macroeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Brexit uncertainty index
Brexit uncertainty (BUI) −0.108 *** −0.101 *** −0.077 −0.189 –
(0.026) (0.032) (0.051) (0.189) –
Observations 412,622 362,609 311,788 261,615 –
Macroeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes –
Industry-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes –
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes –
Notes: The table displays the results of a logistic regression of the likelihood of a buyout in the future (buyout t+1; buyout t+2;
buyout t+3; buyout t+4; buyout t+5) on economic policy uncertainty (Panel A), sterling option-implied volatility (Panel B) and Brexit
uncertainty (Panel C). All regressions are supplemented with several controls for industry and target-specific economic fundamentals,
which for space reasons are not presented. In each regression, the dependent variable assumes a value of 1 if at time t+1, t+2, t+3,
t+4, t+5 a certain target firm is the object of a buyout, and 0 otherwise. All independent variables are continuous and measured
instead at time t. Further in-depth information on the variables included in this table is reported in Section B.1 of the online supporting
information.
***, **, * mark regression coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. We cannot
produce 5-year ahead predictions, since the BUI is different from zero between 2015 and 2019 (i.e. the time window is too narrow).
in the online supporting information). In each re-
gression we use robust standard errors clustered
at the level of the buyout target (portfolio firm).
Moreover, we include industry and firm-level vari-
ables measured in the previous fiscal year (t).
The persistence of uncertainty effect on buyouts.
Following our baseline results in Table 2, we as-
sess the persistence of the effect of an uncertainty
shock on buyout activity. If greater uncertainty
leads PE investors to delay investment, rather than
reduce it, we would expect a reversal in the logit co-
efficient sign. Therefore, in Table 3, we re-explore
our baseline regression, this time considering the
likelihood of a buyout up to 5 years ahead (t+1,
t+2, t+3, t+4, t+5), given an uncertainty shock
at time t (controlling for industry and macroeco-
nomic shocks).
We start our analysis on the persistence of
uncertainty by analysing economic policy uncer-
tainty, or EPU. As reported in Table 3, Panel A,
we do not observe a sign reversal in the response
to greater policy uncertainty in the three following
years – although after 2 years the level of signifi-
cance reduces. The coefficient sign of the EPU in-
dex changes in year t+4, indicating that after an
event increasing policy uncertainty on average it
takes 4 years for PE investment to recover (the PE
investment receives a 4-year delay). This provides
evidence for both the economic significance and
persistence of a policy uncertainty shock to PE in-
vestment, which is in line with our H2. Addition-
ally, we observe in Table 3, Panel B that sterling un-
certainty significantly reduces the likelihood of a
buyout for years (t+1 and t+2) with no significant
reversal in t+3. As for the EPU index, we observe
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Table 4. Comparing the impact of uncertainty on buyouts in the UK vs. the USA
US sample UK sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Buyout t+1 Buyout t+1 Buyout t+1 Buyout t+1 Buyout t+1 Buyout t+1






Brexit uncertainty (BUI) −0.008 −0.080***
(0.007) (0.018)
Constant −2.539*** −2.345*** −2.386*** −1.958*** −2.311*** −2.295***
(0.397) (0.398) (0.395) (0.131) (0.015) (0.021)
Observations 60,024 60,024 60,024 10,008 10,008 10,008
Industry-level FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table displays in columns 1, 2 and 3 the results of a fixed effect logistic regression of the likelihood of a buyout in the USA
in year t+1 on several UKmeasures of uncertainty: EPU, sterling option-implied volatility and BUI. All regressions are supplemented
with industry effects. In columns 4, 5 and 6, we repeat this model specification on our baseline UK buyouts sample to provide a clear
comparison of the regression coefficients of our uncertainty measures. In both regression models, we do not include a control sample
of firms that are never the target of PE buyouts.
***, **, * mark regression coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
a sign reversal in the likelihood of a buyout 4 years
after sterling uncertainty arose, which leads us to
conclude that sterling uncertainty causes an aver-
age 4-year delay of PE buyouts. Finally, Table 3,
Panel C presents the impact of Brexit uncertainty
on the future likelihood of a buyout. In a strong
confirmation of H2, one can observe that the re-
sponse of 3-year-ahead buyout volume to BUI is
negative and persistent. Eventually, it has no sig-
nificant effect on the likelihood of a buyout in year
t+4.
Overall, we observe that Brexit uncertainty leads
to an average 4-year delay in PE buyout, after
which investment is recovered. Following the sec-
ond year ahead of the uncertainty event, the co-
efficient of year t+3 is often not significant, while
that of year t+4 is instead positive and significant
for the EPU and sterling uncertainty variables.
Country counterfactual using the US PE market.
To further establish the findings, we re-run our
analysis for a country that has not experienced
Brexit and hence should not be negatively affected
by the related uncertainty. Arguably, one could
even postulate that the USmarket could have prof-
ited from Brexit by attracting PE capital. In such
a context, the coefficient estimate on uncertainty
measures associated with Brexit should be either
insignificant or even positive.
For this purpose, we use the sample selection
criteria adopted earlier (for UK PE targets) and
create a comparable sample of US private equity
target firms (exploiting the data from Capital IQ).
As the Brexit uncertainty shock is specifically lo-
calized in Britain and the EU, testing our baseline
models on this last samplemay further validate our
findings and support the lack of sampling bias in
our results. Given the lack of identical firm and
industry-specific variables in the new sample, we
perform a panel fixed effect logistic regression us-
ing industry and time fixed effects. We include in
the regression our baselinemodels’ variables of un-
certainty (i.e. EPU, sterling option-implied volatil-
ity and BUI).
Our results, reported in Table 4, show that the
Brexit dimensions of uncertainty adopted in our
baseline model (with the exception of sterling
option-implied volatility, which also accounts for
USD uncertainty) have a strikingly positive effect
on the likelihood of a buyout in the USA. This
indicates that Brexit uncertainty had an impor-
tant andUK-specific negative effect on PE activity,
supporting the validity of our prior results and po-
tentially pointing to cross-country spillover effects
arising from Brexit.
Additional results. In Appendix F in the online
supporting information, we present some addi-
tional results. First, we re-estimate the baseline
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regression during the ‘Brexit period’ (2016–2019)
and find that uncertainty has a significantly neg-
ative impact on PE buyout activity (Section F.1).
Second, we follow the merger waves literature to
account for the counter-cyclicality of target firms’
valuations. We show that the key result about the
negative effect of uncertainty is robust.
The transmission channels of
uncertainty to the PE market
We investigate the three postulated transmission
channels of uncertainty characterized in H3–H5
and developed earlier. First, we consider predic-
tions from theory, predicting that uncertainty will
increase the real option (general partner incen-
tive) to delay investment (cf. Gulen and Ion, 2016;
Quigg, 1993). Bloom et al. (2018), analysing the
impact of Brexit on business investment, found a
significant decrease in business investment in the
UK since the Brexit referendum. Likewise, other
authors such as Serwicka and Tamberi (2018), or
McGrattan and Waddle (2020), found evidence
of a significant shift of foreign direct investment
(FDI) from the UK to other countries in the EU.
Second, we test the potential effect of a greater
interim risk channel, known to significantly de-
press equity valuations (see Bhagwat, Dam and
Harford, 2016) in the interim period between an-
nouncement and completion of an acquisition.
Finally, we test the existence of a greater moral
hazard incentive, created by the high period of
uncertainty and leading limited partners to have
lower control and ability to assess the perfor-
mance of general partners. According to this ar-
gument, when uncertainty is elevated if limited
partners’ (principals’) control over general part-
ner (agent) actions are impaired, this could create
greater empire-building incentives.
Testing the real options transmission channel
As we noted earlier, the value of the option is con-
ditional on three main factors: (i) the degree of
investment irreversibility; (ii) the cost of postpon-
ing the investment (buyout); and (iii) the extent to
which uncertainty affects the investment target (PE
portfolio target). We explore these factors in more
detail below.
Investment irreversibility. To assess the validity of
the real options theory applied to the context of
UK buyouts, we use three different proxies of in-
vestment irreversibility to assess whether the effect
of uncertainty on leveraged buyouts is stronger
for irreversible investments. All measures of invest-
ment irreversibility are measured at the target level
of a given buyout.
The first proxy of investment irreversibility is the
PE target industry capital intensity ratio – com-
puted as the industry mean net property, plant and
equipment (PPE) over total assets. The underlying
assumption is that investment in firms with greater
amounts of fixed assets (PPE) would be harder to
reverse. Therefore, we create a dummyvariable tak-
ing the value of one if a buyout target in a given
year has a greater capital intensity ratio than the
industry median.
Our second proxy of investment irreversibility
is based on given investment sunk costs. In a simi-
lar spirit to Kessides (1990) and Farinas and Ru-
ano (2005), we argue that the greater is the rent
and lease of firm tangible assets, the faster is its
fixed capital depreciation (i.e. the shorter is the life-
cycle of its assets) and the greater is the available
secondary market for firm assets, the lower would
be the sunk costs associated with an acquisition.
Lower sunk costs should reduce the value of the
option to delay a given buyout. Therefore, follow-
ing Gulen and Ion (2016) and Bonaime, Gulen
and Ion (2018), we compute the average industry
level of: rent and lease expenditure; depreciation
expense; and yearly sales of PPE (all scaled by
lagged PPE). We then create a dummy variable to
characterize an industry as having low investment
sunk costs if all three measures are contemporane-
ously above the industry median in a given year.
We then follow Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and
Almeida and Campello (2007) by suggesting that
highly cyclical industries receive a considerably
higher discount on asset liquidation values in pe-
riods of crisis. Therefore, in periods of high un-
certainty, highly cyclical industries are significantly
riskier than less cyclical ones, as firms in the same
industry would be similarly affected by a given un-
certainty shock. To identify cyclical industries, as
is standard practice in the relevant literature (cf.
Sharpe, 1994), we use SIC industry codes identi-
fying cyclical industries as those industries charac-
terized by a greater amount of durable goods.
Lastly, if the predictions from real options the-
ory hold, and hence greater uncertainty creates
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Table 5. Real options channel – economic policy uncertainty
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Investment irreversibility Sunk costs Durable goods industry Industry concentration
Policy uncertainty (EPU) −0.319 ** −0.281 ** −0.433 * −0.539 ***
(0.130) (0.117) (0.236) (0.156)
Investment opportunity −0.213 *** −0.199 ** 0.032 −0.228 **
(0.080) (0.084) (0.125) (0.090)
Industry shock 0.350 *** 0.775 *** −0.038 1.801 ***
(0.103) (0.106) (0.170) (0.151)
TED spread −1.202 −2.432 ** −1.700 −0.862
(1.165) (1.229) (2.171) (1.335)
Industry cumulative returns −0.550 * −0.759 ** −2.191 *** -0.332
(0.287) (0.324) (0.471) (0.330)
Industry cumulative STD
returns
0.696 5.061 *** 4.540 *** −1.214
(0.697) (0.736) (0.866) (0.976)
Industry q 0.348 *** 0.421 *** 0.701 *** 0.655 ***
(0.132) (0.133) (0.192) (0.171)
Total assets 0.006 *** 0.003 * −0.004 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
ROA 0.010 *** 0.008 *** 0.001 0.006 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Leverage −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 **
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash-to-asset −2.078 *** −1.454 *** −2.429 *** −1.871 ***
(0.305) (0.325) (0.665) (0.373)
Constant −7.098 *** −7.580 *** −8.503 *** −9.127 ***
(0.445) (0.424) (0.773) (0.668)
Observations 412,622 181,738 412,622 412,622
Notes:The table displays the results of a logistic regression of the likelihood of a buyout on economic policy uncertainty. All regressions
are supplemented with several controls for industry and target-specific economic fundamentals. In column 1, the dependent variable
assumes a value of 1 if at time t+1 target firms with a degree of investment irreversibility with above the industry median are the object
of a buyout, and 0 otherwise. In column 2, the dependent variable assumes a value of 1 if at time t+1 a target firm pertaining to an
industry with higher sunk costs is the object of a buyout, and 0 otherwise. In column 3, the dependent variable assumes a value of 1 if
at time t+1 a firm from an industry classified in Sharpe (1994) as a durable good industry is the target of a buyout, and 0 otherwise.
Eventually, in column 4, the dependent variable assumes a value of 1 if at time t+1 a target firm from an industry with a high degree
of concentration is the object of a buyout, and 0 otherwise. All independent variables are continuous and measured instead at time t.
Further in-depth information on the variables included in this table is reported in Section B.1 of the online supporting information.
***, **, * mark regression coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
the incentive for the general partner to postpone
investment, this incentive should be lower when
postponement is more costly. In particular, as sug-
gested by Grenadier (2002), delaying investment is
considerably more expensive when the target firms
operate in a highly competitive industry, where
a delay could lead to competitors’ appropriation
of part of the benefits (profitability) yielded by
the investment project. Based on this assumption,
the incentive to delay the (completion of the) in-
vestment until uncertainty is resolved is consid-
erably higher in concentrated industries (i.e. less
competitive), where it is actually relatively inexpen-
sive to delay. To assess industry concentration, we
adopt themethodology used for the creation of the
Herfindahl sales-based index of industry concen-
tration. Therefore, we use a dummy variable taking
the value of one if the median industry sales in a
given year exceed all industries’ sales median, and
zero otherwise. Also, with respect to this proxy of
industry concentration, the results appear robust
and all point to a greater impact of uncertainty on
PE investment within industries that are more con-
centrated rather than vice versa, as predicted by the
real options theory.
In Tables 5, 6 and 7, we show the results of
our baselinemodel regressions including the afore-
mentioned proxies of industry capital intensity,
sunk costs and cyclicality. All the results point to
a uniformly strong effect of uncertainty (with the
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Table 6. Real option channel – sterling option-implied volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Investment
irreversibility




Sterling option-implied volatility −0.045- −0.198 * −0.258 −0.423 ***
(0.097) (0.104) (0.178) (0.123)
Investment opportunity −0.171 ** −0.192 ** 0.060 −0.211 **
(0.081) (0.087) (0.124) (0.087)
Industry shock 0.355 *** 0.785 *** −0.028 1.896 ***
(0.105) (0.110) (0.174) (0.161)
TED spread −0.388 −2.193 * −1.251 −0.431
(1.149) (1.294) (2.301) (1.435)
Industry cumulative returns −0.463 −0.795 ** −2.306 *** −0.450
(0.311) (0.358) (0.539) (0.368)
Industry cumulative STD returns 0.822 5.318 *** 4.877 *** −0.650
(0.690) (0.757) (0.928) (0.963)
Industry q 0.341 ** 0.373 *** 0.669 *** 0.527 ***
(0.135) (0.143) (0.206) (0.188)
Total assets 0.006 *** 0.003 * −0.004 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
ROA 0.010 *** 0.008 *** 0.001 0.006 **
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Leverage −0.000 * −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash-to-asset −2.079 *** −1.452 *** −2.433 *** −1.873 ***
(0.305) (0.325) (0.666) (0.373)
Constant −7.777 *** −8.016 *** −9.246 *** −10.019 ***
(0.338) (0.382) (0.590) (0.586)
Observations 412,622 181,738 412,622 412,622
Notes: The table displays the results of a logistic regression of the likelihood of a buyout on BoE sterling option-implied volatility. All
regressions are supplemented with several controls for industry and target-specific economic fundamentals. In column 1, the dependent
variable assumes a value of 1 if at time t+1 target firms with a degree of investment irreversibility with above the industry median are
the object of a buyout, and 0 otherwise. In column 2, the dependent variable assumes a value of 1 if at time t+1 a target firm pertaining
to an industry with higher sunk costs is the object of a buyout, and 0 otherwise. In column 3, the dependent variable assumes a value of
1 if at time t+1 a firm from an industry classified in Sharpe (1994) as a durable good industry is the target of a buyout, and 0 otherwise.
Eventually, in column 4, the dependent variable assumes a value of 1 if at time t+1 a target firm from an industry with a high degree
of concentration is the object of a buyout, and 0 otherwise. All independent variables are continuous and measured instead at time t.
Further in-depth information on the variables included in this table is reported in Section B.1 of the online supporting information.
***, **, *, - mark regression coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%, 15% level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
exception of sterling option-implied volatility) on
PE activity for buyouts characterized by high levels
of investment irreversibility and analogous mea-
sures – in accordance with H3. This appears to
be the case, with respect to both PE investment in
the entire period of analysis and during the Brexit
period, with statistical significance generally being
higher for regressions estimated using the BUI. On
the contrary, we document a much weaker real op-
tions channel with respect to the transmission of
sterling uncertainty.
Industry-level transmission of Brexit uncertainty.
Next, we examine industry-level transmission of
Brexit uncertainty. As pointed out in Bloom et al.
(2019), ‘The vote for Brexit was a largely un-
expected event and we observe that it has had
a heterogeneous impact on firms according to
their pre-referendum exposure to Europe’ (Bloom
et al., 2019: 2). In light of these findings, we ar-
gue that the incentive to delay investment when
Brexit uncertainty arises is greater for industries
that are more exposed to Brexit uncertainty (i.e.
more exposed to the external trade sector, as in
Bloom et al., 2019, 2020). Of course, measur-
ing exposure to uncertainty can be non-trivial.
Hassan et al. (2020), using tools from computa-
tional linguistics, measured firm-level exposure to
Brexit by analysing the recurrence of discussions
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Table 7. Real option channel – Brexit uncertainty index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Investment
irreversibility




Brexit uncertainty (BUI) −0.216*** −0.089*** −0.097 −0.144***
(0.036) (0.033) (0.064) (0.037)
Investment opportunity −0.114*** −0.046 0.132 −0.150***
(0.043) (0.045) (0.081) (0.051)
Industry shock 0.380*** 0.769*** −0.016 1.820***
(0.101) (0.099) (0.170) (0.145)
TED spread
Industry cumulative returns −0.242 −0.522 −1.968*** 0.036
(0.289) (0.318) (0.517) (0.337)
Industry cumulative STD
returns
−0.318 4.733*** 4.129*** −1.843*
(0.764) (0.710) (0.904) (1.076)
Industry q 0.440*** 0.538*** 0.739*** 0.755***
(0.128) (0.116) (0.180) (0.160)
Total assets 0.006*** 0.003** −0.004 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
ROA 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.001 0.006**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Leverage −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash-to-asset −2.071*** −1.446*** −2.427*** −1.864***
(0.302) (0.325) (0.665) (0.372)
Constant −7.608*** −8.545*** −9.417*** −10.037***
(0.256) (0.235) (0.354) (0.487)
Observations 412,622 181,738 412,622 412,622
Notes: The table displays the results of a logistic regression of the likelihood of a buyout on the BUI. All regressions are supplemented
with several controls for industry and target-specific economic fundamentals. In column 1, the dependent variable assumes a value
of 1 if at time t+1 target firms with a degree of investment irreversibility with above the industry median are the object of a buyout,
and 0 otherwise. In column 2, the dependent variable assumes a value of 1 if at time t+1 a target firm pertaining to an industry with
higher sunk costs is the object of a buyout, and 0 otherwise. In column 3, the dependent variable assumes a value of 1 if at time t+1 a
firm from an industry classified in Sharpe (1994) as a durable good industry is the target of a buyout, and 0 otherwise. Eventually, in
column 4, the dependent variable assumes a value of 1 if at time t+1 a target firm from an industry with a high degree of concentration
is the object of a buyout, and 0 otherwise. All independent variables are continuous and measured instead at time t. Further in-depth
information on the variables included in this table is reported in Section B.1 of the online supporting information.
***, **, * mark regression coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
of benefits (and costs) associated with Brexit in
listed firms’ quarterly earning conference calls pro-
ceedings. They find a much stronger transmission
of Brexit-related uncertainty (e.g. leading to out-
comes such as loss of investment, employment,
productivity, etc.) to firms that are highly exposed
to Brexit.Wemeasure external exposure using data
on industry-level import and export from the UK
Office for National Statistics (ONS). In particular,
we compute for each industry and year the differ-
ence between the industry median of import (IM),
export (X) and total exposure (IM+X) and the na-
tional median in a given year t. We then assess the
impact of Brexit-related uncertainty on the proba-
bly of a buyout in an industry with high exposure
to Brexit (i.e. exposure to the external sector).
In Table 8, we find that sectors more heavily ex-
posed to the external sector have a lower likeli-
hood of buyout as a result of greater Brexit uncer-
tainty, in line with H3. We repeat the test using the
EPU and sterling uncertainty from 2016 onward,
instead of the BUI, and our results remain robust
and unaffected (see columns 2, 5 and 7). In con-
firmation of the above argument, we do not find
evidence of a greater transmission of uncertainty
to industries heavily exposed to the external sector
before the Brexit referendum (see columns 3 and
6).
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Table 8. Buyouts in industries highly exposed to Brexit






























Brexit uncertainty (BUI) −0.119***
(0.034)
Observations 408,036 163,050 261,615 408,036 163,050 261,615 408,036
Macroeconomic
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table displays the results of a logistic regression of the likelihood of a buyout in a given industry on economic policy
uncertainty (columns 1, 2 and 3), sterling option-implied volatility (column 4, 5 and 6) andBrexit uncertainty (column 7). The likelihood
of an industry receiving PE investment is expressed as a function of the industry exposure to the external sector (IM+X). All regressions
are supplemented with several controls for industry and target-specific economic fundamentals. In each year t, the dependent variable
assumes a value of 1 if at time t+1 a firm belonging to an industry with external sector exposure higher than themedian for all industries
is the target of a buyout, and 0 otherwise. In columns 1, 4 and 7, we consider the likelihood of PE buyouts in industries highly exposed
to the external sector over the whole period (pre- and post-Brexit referendum). In columns 2 and 5, we analyse the likelihood of PE
buyouts in industries highly exposed to the external sector just in the year of the Brexit referendum and after. Instead, in columns
3 and 6, we re-perform the logistic model analysing the years before the referendum. Overall, this analysis enables us to compare
the coefficients’ sign and significance before and after the referendum, therefore, to assess potential differences in the transmission of
uncertainty to the private equity industry. All independent variables are continuous and measured instead at time t. Further in-depth
information on the variables included in this table is reported in Section B.1 of the online supporting information.
***, **, *, - mark regression coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%, 15% level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Testing the interim risk channel
In Table 9, we test whether across our whole sam-
ple period and in the Brexit period, uncertainty
transmitted to the buyout market through this
channel. In an interim risk channel, uncertainty
transmits to PE activity in the interim period,
hence leading investors to postpone (or cancel) in-
vestment.10 However, crucially, deals with a longer
interim period are subject to much greater interim
risk than deals with shorter interim periods.
Therefore, we measure the interim periods of all
buyout deals considered in our analysis and as-
sess the impact of policy uncertainty (in column 1),
sterling option-implied volatility (in column 2) and
Brexit uncertainty (in column 3) on the likelihood
10Tests for this channel are exclusively performed on UK
firms that at some point in the period of analysis were the
target of a buyout. These are indeed the only ones that
can have an interim period (and hence are exposed to this
channel).
of a buyout of a target with a longer than the in-
dustry median interim period. We find that neither
policy uncertainty nor sterling uncertainty signif-
icantly affect the likelihood of a buyout – based
on the target interim period – hence, we find no
evidence of an interim risk channel for the whole
period of analysis (2010–2019). On the contrary,
Brexit uncertainty significantly reduced the likeli-
hood of buyout of a target with longer interim pe-
riod than the industry median. This implies that
during the years of elevated Brexit uncertainty, not
only were buyouts more unlikely, and investment
lost (as we found in Tables 2 and 3), but the in-
terim risk channel played a role, in agreement with
H4.
Testing the moral hazard channel
We build our empirical setting to investigate
the empire-building incentive by focusing on the
‘value-destruction’ implications of this channel.
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Table 9. Interim risk channel
(1) (2) (3)
Interim risk Interim risk Interim risk
Policy uncertainty (EPU) −0.107
(0.201)
Sterling option-implied volatility 0.080
(0.161)
Brexit uncertainty (BUI) −0.100**
(0.050)
Investment opportunity 0.003 0.028 0.041
(0.078) (0.077) (0.059)
Industry shock −0.167 −0.164 −0.122
(0.186) (0.184) (0.168)
TED spread −0.500 −0.437
(0.440) (0.395)
Industry cumulative returns −0.217 −0.112 −0.088
(0.471) (0.474) (0.490)
Industry cumulative STD returns −3.493** −3.406** −4.068***
(1.445) (1.472) (1.530)
Industry q 0.208 0.211 0.262
(0.156) (0.155) (0.166)
Total assets 0.154*** 0.154*** 0.150***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022)
ROA 0.017* 0.017* 0.015*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Leverage 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Cash-to-asset −0.168 −0.142 −0.346
(0.572) (0.566) (0.592)
Constant −3.366*** −3.613*** −3.502***
(0.560) (0.396) (0.420)
Observations 6,888 6,888 6,888
Notes: The table displays the results of a logistic regression of the likelihood of a buyout of a target firm with interim period above
the industry median on economic policy uncertainty (column 1), sterling option-implied volatility (column 2) and Brexit uncertainty
(column 4). All regressions are supplemented with several controls for industry and target-specific economic fundamentals, which for
space reasons are not presented. In each regression, the dependent variable assumes a value of 1 if at time t+1 a PE target firm has
interim period greater than the industry median, and 0 otherwise. All independent variables are continuous and measured instead at
time t. Tests for this regression are performed exclusively on firms which at some point in time have been the target of buyouts, as only
those would have data on the buyout interim period. The considered period of analysis is 2010–2019. Further in-depth information on
the variables included in this table is reported in Section B.1 of the online supporting information.
***, **, * mark regression coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
We do so by assessing the change in our baseline
model accounting variables (ROA, operating in-
come, total assets and cash-to-assets) around the
time of the buyout (between t−1 and t+1) in mo-
ments of high (Brexit) uncertainty and low (Brexit)
uncertainty,11 and we test the significance of the
difference of the coefficients in the two time peri-
ods.
11We classify years of high uncertainty as such if in those
years a given uncertainty measure has values above the
median for the whole period of analysis. In contrast, years
with low uncertainty have a value below the entire period
median.
The results presented in Table 10 show that deals
realized in periods of high policy uncertainty are
characterized by a higher short-term growth in
ROA and by lower operating income than those in
periods of low policy uncertainty (see PanelA).We
find no sign of moral hazard when comparing pe-
riods of high and low sterling option volatility (see
Panel B).Hence, the evidence does not supportH5.
In periods of high Brexit uncertainty, we observe
that only deals with a greater change in ROA are
significant – all other variables being not signifi-
cant (see Panel C).We find this evidence refutes the
‘empire-building channel’. Periods of high uncer-
tainty are in fact characterized by a loss of buyout
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Table 10. Moral hazard channel
High Low High − low
Panel A: Economic policy uncertainty
Delta ROA 0.016*** 0.002 0.014**
(0.005) (0.005)






Delta cash-to-asset 0.049 −0.071 0.11
(0.044) (0.201)
Constant −2.257*** −2.061*** −0.196
(0.051) (0.053)
Panel B: Sterling option-implied volatility
Delta ROA 0.008 0.010** −0.002
(0.005) (0.005)






Delta cash-to-asset 0.026 0.136 −0.011
(0.043) (0.159)
Constant −2.219*** −2.161*** 0.058
(0.061) (0.061)
Panel C: Brexit uncertainty index
Delta ROA 0.016*** 0.003 0.013**
(0.005) (0.005)






Delta cash-to-asset 0.043 −0.060 0.103
(0.041) (0.280)
Constant −2.185*** −2.254*** 0.069
(0.045) (0.062)
Notes: The table displays the results of a logistic regression of the likelihood of year t displaying a level of economic policy uncertainty
above (or below) the median (Panel A), sterling option-implied volatility above (or below) the median (Panel B) and Brexit uncertainty
above (or below) the median (Panel C). All regressions use as independent variables target-level information on the change in return on
assets, total assets, operating income and cash-to-assets in the 2 years around the buyout (i.e. in the period ranging from 1 year before
to after the buyout). In column 1, the dependent variable takes the value 1 if in year t the level of uncertainty is above the median for
the whole period. In column 2, the dependent variable takes the value 1 if in a given year, the level of uncertainty is above the median
for the whole period. In column 3, we test the significance of the difference between the logistic regression coefficients. The considered
period of analysis is 2010–2019. Further in-depth information on the variables included in this table is reported in Section B.1 of the
online supporting information.
***, **, * mark regression coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
deals, as explained above, rather than an increase –
as the moral hazard channel would predict. More-
over, deals realized in periods of uncertainty do
not seem to compromise shareholder value, as hy-
pothesized by Duchin and Schmidt (2013).
Conclusions
In this paper we explore the role of uncertainty on
PE activity in the UK by developing new hypothe-
ses and employing a novel dataset of PE targets
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and non-targets from 2010 to 2019. Our particu-
lar focus is to elicit the uncertainty stemming from
the Brexit referendum and contrast it with other
forms of uncertainty (e.g. macroeconomic, equity
and currency). Uncertainty from Brexit is directly
measured by employing the recent Bloom et al.
(2019) BUI constructed from surveys to the CFOs
of approximately 3,000 UK businesses. To com-
plement this approach, we conduct a finer-grained
analysis of the relevance of potential uncertainty
transmission channels that might affect buyouts.
Strikingly, we provide evidence that uncertainty
affects PE activity negatively, even when control-
ling for economic activity. Brexit-related uncer-
tainty has a significant negative effect, which is dis-
tinctly different from other forms of uncertainty
and consequently augments the other uncertain-
ties PE companies are facing. Moreover, uncer-
tainty not only reduces PE activity but also de-
lays PE buyouts. In terms of transmission chan-
nels, we provide evidence that Brexit-related uncer-
tainty operates via the real options channel and the
interim channel but has no statistically measurable
effect via the moral hazard channel. Notably, un-
certainty particularly affects sectors where invest-
ments are relatively irreversible, sunk costs are high
and goods durable. Overall, our empirical analysis
finds strong empirical support for the negative ef-
fects of uncertainty on PE activity in the UK, as
conjectured by Wright et al. (2016).
Of course, Brexit uncertainty is presently ongo-
ing. Our results suggest that this particular uncer-
tainty will continue to result in less PE activity and,
as a corollary, reduced investment and economic
activity in the UK. To avoid the continued ampli-
fication of negative long-run economic effects, we
would urge UK policymakers to resolve such un-
certainties as quickly as possible. This work and
our conclusions are built on the foundations of
some earlier work byMikeWright and co-authors.
Wewould like to note thatMikeWright’s work was
highly original, influential and vast, in both scope
and scale. He was also a great friend to many. We
very much hope that our work above, building on
just a few of his many insights into private equity,
can be seen as part of a fitting tribute.
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